The rapid growth of grid-connected embedded generation is changing the operational characteristics of power distribution networks. Amongst a range of issues being reported in the research, the effect of these changes on so-called 'traditional protection systems' has not gone without attention. Looking to the future, the possibility of microgrid systems and deliberate islanding of sections of the network will require highly flexible distribution management systems and a re-design of protection strategies. This paper explores the envisaged protection issues concerned with large penetrations of embedded generation in distribution networks extending into auto-reclosure and protection device coordination. A critical review of recently reported protection strategies for grid-connected only and microgrid operation is also undertaken. The outcome is a list of recommendations to achieve microgrid protection adequacy in future networks. 
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Introduction
The increasing pressure for renewable or 'green' energy coupled with government funded economic incentives has caused a paradigm shift in the way residential, commercial and governmental bodies approach energy investment. The shift has predominantly manifested through the dramatic increase in the presence of grid-connected embedded generation (EG) in distribution networks (DNs).
DNs were designed under the premise of radial power flow [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
The introduction of small-scale EG introduces the possibility of bi-directional power flow, rendering the network non-radial. The integrity of DN design philosophy is compromised and a detailed analysis is required to ascertain the implications of various levels of EG penetration.
For the purposes of this paper, the DN encompasses the electrical infrastructure between a zone substation and a customer's point of connection 1 (POC).
Reviews of proposed protection schemes in microgrids have been conducted by Mirsaeidi et al. in [6] and Gopalan et al. in [7] . Both offer excellent synopses of microgrid protection schemes. The purpose of this paper is to expand upon the range of investigated microgrid protection schemes and proffer a more in-depth explanation and analysis of each proposed protection scheme. Furthermore, this paper provides supplementary recommendations for a more holistic approach towards microgrid protection design philosophy.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II discusses the possible issues concerning the continued proliferation of EG in DNs.
The discussion extends to recloser, fuse, sectionaliser and EG coordination in contemporary DNs. Section III reviews proposed protection strategies by various authors for DNs employing grid-connected only operation. Section IV provides a critical analysis of microgrid protection strategies encompassing both grid-connected and autonomous modes of operation. Finally, Section V outlines the preferred protection schemes to be adopted should a modular microgrid become a reality. A summary of the analysed protection schemes is given in the appendix.
Contemporary DN Protection Systems

Over Current and Earth Fault protection
Traditional protective devices in DNs consist of reclosers, sectionalisers and fuses. All reclosers interrupt fault current using a circuit breaker (CB).
To coordinate protective devices, traditional DN protection schemes implement graded over current (OC) protection and earth fault (EF) protection.
OC and EF protection gradings are achieved using inverse definite minimum time (IDMT) curves. Each curve incorporates an error margin in order to account for delays in signal processing, signal transmission and the time for the circuit breaker to open and extinguish the fault.
A radial network has only one source of fault current. Therefore, any protective devices located between the fault source and the fault will observe (almost) the same fault current. IDMT curves must be arranged carefully to ensure that the minimum number of customers are disconnected when a fault is isolated. The design process of choosing appropriate IDMT curves does not incorporate the effects of EG. In fact, the IEEE Standard states that:
"Any distributed resource installation connected to a spot network shall not cause operation or prevent reclosing of any network protectors installed on the spot network. This coordination shall be accomplished without requiring any changes to prevailing network protector clearing time practices of the area electric power system [8] ."
Experimentally, OC and EF protection have been shown to be susceptible to poor discrimination in networks with a high EG penetration [9, 10] .
Hence, a threshold of EG penetration must exist that defines the boundary where a network does not comply with the protective requirements stipu- [11] . The EG threshold before DN protection failure is poorly defined and is an area of research that requires further investigation.
Failure of OC and EF protection discrimination can be achieved in two ways. Firstly, a protection devices can trip unnecessarily for a fault outside of that protection device's zone of protection. Secondly, a protection device can fail to trip when a fault occurs within that protection device's zone of protection. These protection failures are referred to as a nuisance trip and fail-to-trip respectively. Consider the circuit shown in Fig. 1 . The star designates a fault which is located in CB2's zone of protection. Fault current will flow through all circuit breakers; however, CB1 and CB3 will experience a fault current in the opposite direction to normal power flow. OC and EF devices are not equipped with directional elements in DNs; hence, the trip time of CB1 and and CB3 can be expressed through each circuit breaker's respective IDMT curve. The IDMT curves of CB1 and CB2 are not graded in the protection planning process due to the assumption of radial power flow -no fault current will flow through CB1 during a fault in CB2's zone of protection if the DN is radial. While it is unlikely that CB1 would trip before CB2 isolates the fault, a CB1 nuisance trip may occur if the pick-up current of CB1 is significantly lower than CB2. The result would be the unnecessary loss of all customers on the CB1's corresponding feeder. Customers will likely be reconnected after an auto-reclosure once CB2 isolates the fault. However, the reliability of the overall network is compromised.
Similarly, CB3 would observe fault current in the opposite direction of radial power flow during the fault in CB's zone of protection. In the unlikely event that the reverse fault current is sufficient to trip CB3, no extra customers are lost. A trip at CB2 isolates all customers downstream of CB2 which includes all customers downstream of CB3. All islanded EG units will isolate themselves via anti-islanding protection and reclosure attempts of CB2 and CB3 will ensure that the final operational state of each circuit breaker is identical to an equivalent situation with no EG connection. However, the operation of CB3 violates the IEEE Standard 1547-2003 [8] .
The fault current provided by EG2 will increase the voltage drop between EG2 and the fault, reducing the fault current passing through CB2. During a high impedance end of zone fault, the presence of EG may cause the fault current flowing through a protection device to be below the pick-up current. In such a case, a fail-to-trip would occur, increasing the likelihood of bushfires as well as electrocution risk to customers and utility personnel.
Fault discrimination problems caused by high penetrations of EG can pose a significant threat to DN reliability and safety.
Contrary to discrimination, protection selectivity between reclosers can be improved through EG connection. Consider the circuit shown in Fig. 2 .
CB2 and CB3 are graded to ensure that CB3 will operate before CB2 for a fault in CB3's zone of protection. Due to the presence of an EG unit between Vs CB1 CB2 EG1 EG2
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Figure 2: Protection Selectivity Example CB2 and CB3, the current observed by CB3 is greater than CB2. Hence, the time difference between a CB3 trip and a CB2 trip will be greater than the graded IDMT curves would suggest. Hence, the selectivity of an OC/EF protection scheme can be improved through EG connection. However, there are further complications that must be considered concerning auto-reclosure.
Recloser-EG Coordination
Reclosers will typically trip before an EG unit's anti-islanding protection will detect loss of mains (LOM to energise a network prior to a reclosure by the DN protection system [8] .
Hence, it is important to consider the impact of EG anti-islanding operation when selecting reclosure times.
Further, it is possible for an EG unit to sustain an arc even after a recloser has isolated the fault from the main supply [13] . The purpose of the recloser dead time is to allow the arc path to de-ionise, thus removing the fault, assuming the fault is temporary. If the arc is sustained by EG, a temporary fault may become permanent, reducing the reliability of the network.
A trade-off is necessary when coordinating reclosers with EG units. The
recloser must be open for long enough to ensure that anti-islanding protection can operate, but short enough such so that the interruption experienced by customers is minimised. The coordination is further complicated when fuses and sectionalisers are installed within the DN.
Recloser-Fuse-EG Coordination
Reclosers are essential to maintain high reliability levels as most faults on DNs are temporary [5] . Spurs, off the backbone of a feeder, are normally protected by a fuse. Whenever a fuse isolates a fault by burning out, that fuse has to be replaced by utility personnel before supply is regained to customers downstream of the blown fuse. In order to further increase the reliability of DNs, reclosers are coordinated with fuses such that the recloser will isolate before the fuse will blow on the first detection of a fault. If the fault is temporary, the fault will usually be cleared before the first reclose and no more protection operations will be necessary. If the fault is still present, the fault is considered permanent; the fuse will blow faster than the recloser trip time. Hence, two separate IDMT curves are used for reclosers which are coordinated with fuses: a fast IDMT curve that will trip the recloser before the fuse blows and a slow IDMT curve that will allow the fuse to burn out if the fault is still present (and downstream of that fuse). The inclusion of EG in DNs increases the likelihood of a fuse blowing out on a temporary fault before the recloser with a fast IDMT curve trips [2, 14] .
In contemporary DNs, EG penetration levels are low and do not provide sufficient fault current to interfere with protection grading nor selectivity.
However, as EG penetration rises, the aggregate fault current supplied by EG units may cause fuses to blow unnecessarily. Fig. 3 shows an example DN where a fuse has been coordinated with an upstream recloser programmed with both a fast and slow IMDT curve. The additional fault current supplied by the local EG implies that the fault current measured by the recloser is smaller than the fault current flowing through the fuse. If the difference in fault current is significant enough, the fuse may blow before the fast IDMT curve programmed within the recloser will send a trip signal. The overall reliability of the network will be significantly reduced as most faults within DNs are temporary in nature [5] .
Recloser-Sectionaliser-EG Coordination
Sectionalisers are incapable of extinguishing the fault current levels asso- However, if the fault current is sustained by the local EG, the current rating of the sectionaliser may be exceeded. Either the sectionaliser would be damaged upon trying to open with a sustained fault current or the sectionaliser may fail to detect an upstream CB operation. In either case, the overall reliability of the DN would be compromised.
Anti-Islanding Protection
Anti-islanding protection is responsible for preventing instances of unintentional islanding in DNs. Unintentional islanding is any situation where EG continues to supply a subsection of a network despite being isolated from the mains supply. There are significant technical and safety issues that might arise from an islanding situation. Consequently, intentional islanding is forbidden by the Australian Standard AS4777.3 [12] . Anti-islanding protection can be broadly classified into three different types: passive, active and communications based. In contemporary applications, anti-islanding protection is limited to passive and active types.
According to comprehensive reports on anti-islanding technology, there is no form of non-communications or utility based anti-islanding protection without a non-detection zone (NDZ) [16, 17] . In practice, however, the risks of most NDZs being realised are very small. However, as EG penetration rises, the risk of anti-islanding protection failure increases. Anti-islanding protection failure can lead to out-of-phase reclosure, decreased reliability and risk of electrocution to utility personnel.
Anti-islanding protection design is not a focus within this paper. A plethora of different anti-islanding methods have been proposed and assessed [16, 17] . The operational characteristics of an island that are required to prevent islanding detection within two seconds cannot be achieved with contemporary EG penetration sizes and limitations stipulated by utilities [18] .
However, if EG restrictions are lifted and EG penetration levels can approach 100% within DNs, the likelihood of anti-islanding protection failure to detect LOM increases significantly. In such a case, traditional DN line protection would be completely inadequate. A significant protection design philosophy reform would be necessary, including the protection of EG units.
When EG penetration levels exceed 100% of DN capacity, a logical evolution of DN operation is the microgrid concept. Within a microgrid, antiislanding protection is unnecessary, yet the detection of LOM is still vital such that the control and protection schemes employed by an EG unit can change as required. For instance, the control scheme of EG units may change from constant-power control to droop control to ensure proper load following as the microgrid transitions into autonomous mode. It is important to recognise that the protection techniques implemented in microgrids are also valid for grid-connected only operation as a microgrid must be capable of isolating a fault during both grid-connected and autonomous modes of operation.
Conversely, grid-connected only protection techniques can be implemented in a microgrid during grid-connected operation.
Proposed Protection Schemes for DNs with Grid-Connected EG
The introduction of EG in DNs subverts the premise of radiality central to traditional DN protection philosophy. The non-radiality of DNs can be likened to the power flow observed in transmission networks. The protection philosophy for transmission networks implements distance and directional protective elements to detect and locate faults despite the presence multiple fault current sources. However, the energy resources connected to transmission networks are typically large-scale synchronous machines that are capable of delivering large fault currents. Hence, the principles used in transmission networks could in theory be utilised in DNs with a high EG penetration if EG units were interfaced through synchronous machines and the extra expense of directional and/or distance protection can be justified.
The implementation of directional OC relays is proposed by Bhalja et al.
in [19] . All EG units midway through a line have two separate protection devices with directional elements connected on each side of that EG unit's POC. All other DN protective devices are non-directional. There are many concerns with such a protection scheme. There is a significant extra cost as two current transformers, two relays and two circuit breakers are necessary for each EG unit connected midway through a feeder. The scheme also assumes that EG units are interfaced through synchronous machines which is often not the case. Inverter-interfaced EG units would likely be unable to provide enough fault current for adequate protection discrimination during to the limited thermal inertia of power electronics switches. Finally, nondirectional relays connected at the upstream end each feeder could trip due to EG feeding faults on adjacent feeders. Hence, it may be appropriate for all OC protective devices to be equipped with directional elements with an EG unit downstream of that protective device.
An adaptive protection scheme that incorporates protection against voltage sag is proposed by Choi et al. in [20] . In the paper, a single end-of-line synchronous generator is the adopted EG interface in the case study. The 
Proposed Protection Schemes for Microgrid Applications
An effective, robust and experimentally verified protection design philosophy for intentional islanding has not yet been developed. Many protection schemes have been proffered by a variety of authors. Arguably, protection is the least understood topic within the realm of microgrid design philosophy largely due to the unusual fault response of inverter interfaced EG.
Traditional OC protection alone has been proven to be insufficient for micro-grids containing inverter-interfaced generators [23] . Coordinating protection devices across both grid-connected and autonomous modes of operation to maintain adequate redundancy, discrimination and selectivity is a key focus in contemporary protection research.
The simplest method of maintaining a significant fault current during islanded operation is through connection of machines with a significant inherent inertia. The authors of [24] propose the inclusion of a flywheel system to complement inverter-interfaced EG in order to supply a significant current when a fault occurs in an islanded microgrid. Flywheel systems are very useful in applications containing critical load, especially when coupled with dispatchable power such as diesel generators [25] . However, flywheels are expensive and require a sophisticated control scheme for coordination with EG in a microgrid. Due to the high cost of such a scheme, it is unlikely that every inverter-interfaced EG unit will be equipped with a flywheel system.
Thus, it is envisaged that a communications medium would be necessary to instigate an inter trip to isolate all non-inertial EG when a relay located at an inertial EG unit detects a fault. There is also no consideration for back up protection for cases of communications or flywheel failure.
Three protection design schemes for microgrids are proffered by Conti et al. [26] . Each scheme assumes the presence of a microgrid central controller and thus communications, which is a subversion of the desirable and well established plug-and-play microgrid design philosophy [27, 28, 29] . Each scheme also employs OC protection and hence cannot be considered appropriate for inverter-interfaced EG.
The first scheme proposed in [26] uses conventional OC protection to isolate the fault at the protection device at the 'satellite centre' (SC) (the circuit breaker immediately downstream of SC in Fig. 5 ) of the microgrid. A microgrid protection scheme for inverter-interfaced EG dominated networks is proposed by Loix et al. in [30] . The use of inverter-interfaced EG can have significant benefits from a stability perspective provided the inverter is rated sufficiently to provide adequate fault ride-through. An inverter interface decouples the dynamics of an energy source or machine from the grid [31] ; the inverter can be controlled to provide a desirable response to disturbances given that the ratings of the IGBTs are not exceeded and enough short term energy is available from the DC bus. For the protection scheme proposed in [30] , a fault current limiter is necessary to ensure an inverter-interfaced EG will aid in fault detection without exceeding current ratings. The proposed protection scheme uses sequence components to identify the fault location and uses time delays to achieve protection coordination. Communications may be used to reduce the trip time, but is not essential to achieve protection adequacy. The major omission of the proposed scheme is a discussion regarding protection discrimination capabilities, particularly during the presence of high impedance faults. The zero sequence fault current may not be significantly different from an unbalanced load current. Furthermore, transformer connections and earthing configurations are not taken into account may provide multiple (or no) zero sequence current paths.
The authors in [32] use directional OC, negative sequence current and zero sequence current protection to detect faults within a microgrid. For high impedance faults, an energy level based protection proposed by [33] is adopted. However, there exist some loads that behave similarly to high impedance faults [33] ; hence, discrimination problems may arise. The proposed control scheme includes the provision of blocking signals between protective elements to preclude false trips due to faults in adjacent zones of protection. There are several advantages to using blocking signals to ensure selectivity and redundancy in DNs. Firstly, the use of blocking signals provides back-up protection for circuit breaker failure. Blocking signals will only be transmitted long enough for the fault to be isolated according to the IDMT curve programmed within each relay. If a circuit breaker has failed to isolate the fault, the blocking signal will be removed and the adjacent circuit breaker will trip, providing adequate back-up protection. Secondly, assuming com-munications infrastructure is healthy, selectivity can be achieved in tandem with fast tripping times, improving the stability of the network. Protective devices no longer have to wait until each upstream device has the opportunity to isolate a fault before tripping. Finally, in the event of communications failure, the protection scheme will still isolate the fault. The disadvantage of communications failure is that selectivity will be compromised which will result in an unnecessary disconnection of supply to some customers. Such a disadvantage can be considered acceptable within the context of safe microgrid operation.
The use of differential protection in microgrids been proposed by Zeineldin et al. in [34] for microgrid application, similarly to Conti in [26] . To accomplish differential protection, the end of each line must be equipped with a current transformer, relay and circuit breaker. A communications link will be necessary between devices on the end of each line such that the end of line currents can be compared. A relay will send a trip signal if the difference in current exceeds a predetermined level. In the proposed scheme in [34] , each EG unit is assumed to keep contemporary anti-islanding protection that will inform the central controller and EG unit whether an island has formed. Constant current control is used for grid-connected operation and P-V control is used for autonomous control. The proposed protection scheme offers very effective protection discrimination and selectivity assuming all components are working properly. However, no provision for back up protection during communications or circuit breaker failure is given. Furthermore, the proposed protection scheme is very expensive and only appropriate for sub-transmission level microgrids with limited spurs and loads.
Instantaneous communication based differential protection is proposed as an effective protection scheme for microgrids in [35] . In the event of a circuit breaker failure, adjacent relays would receive an inter-trip signal to isolate a fault. However, provision for communication failure is not given.
The authors in [36] investigate the efficacy of differential protection, but only consider three-phase bolted faults which are uncommon. Regardless, differential protection would theoretically provide adequate discrimination and selectivity for any type of fault given the fault current exceeds 10% of nominal current flow [35] .
The use of voltage-restrained over-current (VROC) relays in inverter dominated microgrids is proposed by Tumilty et al. in [37] . The feasibility of using solely voltage-based protection techniques for protection adequacy in a network is explored in the paper. The paper concludes that topological selectivity is problematic and impractical for complex microgrids. In some cases, protection discrimination through THD may be impossible.
Furthermore, the proposed scheme is inappropriate for high impedance faults which may only provide a voltage drop similar to significant unbalanced operation. There might also exist complications caused by dynamic loads which could cause nuisance tripping [4] . It is noted in [4] that protection using THD can only be a back-up or complementary form of protection [4] .
Li et al. proffer a protection scheme for inverter dominated networks in [41] termine the location of the fault using a Rogowski sensor [42] . If the first two wavefronts detected by a protective device have the same polarity, the fault is located within the relay's zone of protection as shown in Fig. 7 . If the fault can be located, selectivity is assured and the fault will be isolated much quicker than traditional protection devices. The shortcoming of using wavefronts for protection analysis is the ambiguity of the fault inception angle. If the fault occurs when the voltage is not near peak, the protection performance will be inadequate. A rate of change of current back-up protection is proposed; however, the discrimination between fault events and acceptable disturbances has not been assessed and requires further research to determine the efficacy of the proposed protection scheme.
Distance protection is proposed for microgrid protection in [43] as the recommended form of primary protection. Directional OC and EF elements are A similar approach is adopted by Dewadasa et al. in [44] using an admittance-based protection scheme for application in inverter dominated microgrids. Each DN line protective device implements IDMT curves to express the tripping time as a function of normalised admittance Y r as expressed in (1).
Where Y m is the measured admittance of the relay and Y t is the admittance for a zero impedance fault at the end of the protection zone. The scheme is shown to work for a three-phase bolted fault when the microgrid is operating in islanded mode. Further research is needed to identify whether admittance protection is effective for high impedance phase-to-earth faults.
A differential energy based scheme is proposed by Samantaray et al.
in [45] . An S-transform is used to analyse the current waveform; the Stransform is a time-frequency transform that is an aggregate wavelet and short-time Fourier transform. The current is measured and modified using the S-transform to find the spectral energy content at each protective device. (2) is discussed in [46] .
The differential phase current scheme proved effective for phase-to-earth 
Conclusion
The protection of DNs with a high EG penetration is a very complex topic. There are many degrees of entropy including network topology, gridconnected or autonomous modes of operation, EG size and type, transformer connections, earthing connection and protective device locations which have a significant impact on the efficacy of the proposed protection schemes. Furthermore, there is a heightened desire for cost effectiveness for EG proprietors due to the auxiliary costs of protection and control constituting a much higher percentage of the overall cost compared with large-scale generation [27] .
Protection adequacy in contemporary networks can be achieved through careful planning and restricting the amount of EG penetration in each feeder.
Safe recloser operation can be achieved through setting reclose attempt durations to greater than two seconds, ensuring all EG is isolated and fault arcs There is limited research investigating the probability of protection discrimination and selectivity to be achieved for each proposed protection scheme.
The range of plausible microgrid network topologies renders such an exercise impractical, particularly when considering highly modular microgrids.
Rather, a protection system capable of dynamically assessing the protection adequacy of a microgrid with high redundancy is highly desirable. It is Hence, applications may not be effective under some earthing schemes.
Appendix
